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Consumer Protection and National
Housing Policy: The Problem of
New-Home Defects
Thomas H. Stanton*
This article discusses the needfor consumer protection against latent defects in
new housing. After surveying state andprivale attempts toprovide new-housing war-
ranties, the author outlines the elements of effective warrantyprotection and demon-
strates that its benefts are greater than its costs to home buyers and to the housing
industry. Mr. Stanton then reviews past and present federal housing policies and
shows that consumer protection has traditionally been subordinated to credit goals.
He concludes by reviewing the increasing involvement of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion in meeting consumer housing protection needs.
INTRODUCTION
A HOME is the largest single purchase most consumers ever
make. The average American household, whether it rents or
owns a home, spends about thirty percent of its disposable income
on housing.' In 1977, consumers purchased 820,000 newly con-
structed 2 and 3.6 million previously occupied homes.3 At an aver-
* B.A. (1965), University of California (Davis); M.A. (1967), Yale University; J.D.
(1970), Harvard University. The author is Deputy Director of the Office of Policy Planning
of the Federal Trade Commission. The views presented in this article are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the FTC or its staff.
1. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, housing expenditures currently ac-
count for a 29% share of the Consumer Price Index, by far the largest share of consumer
expenditures. This figure includes the expense of mortgage interest but not outlays for
related items such as fuel or home furnishings. The percentage must be used carefully
since it reflects statistical assumptions necessary for computing the Consumer Price Index
but not necessarily optimal for calculating actual disposable income. Interview with Mr.
John Marcut, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Oct. 10, 1978).
2. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NA-
TIONAL HOUSING GOAL-1977 at 14 (1978). This figure does not include approximately
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age cost of $54,000 for a new home and $47,900 for a used home
that year, aggregate purchases totaled $225 billion.4 Unfair and
deceptive practices in housing construction and in the marketing
of new homes thus potentially affect many consumers, adding un-
necessary expense to the family housing budget and causing con-
siderable discomfort as well. Many problems in the quality of a
newly purchased home may manifest themselves only after the
home has weathered several seasons. Since most home buyers
lack the expertise to evaluate latent defects, they need some form
of protection in making this substantial investment.
This need for consumer protection occurs in the context of
long-standing federal involvement with housing, through such
agencies as the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Veterans Administration (VA), and the Farmers'
Home Administration (FMHA). These agencies, however, are
concerned primarily with housing production and especially with
housing finance. Their concern for consumer protection is inci-
dental to their goal of assuring a national market in home mort-
gages and to other housing credit activities. As a result, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), in accordance with its man-
date to police the marketplace against unfair and deceptive trade
practices,6 is an especially important federal agency providing
500,000 single-family homes built by owners or custom-built by contractors on owners'
land. Id. at 15.
3. Id. app. at D-10.
4. In addition, the expense of mortgage interest at. say, 10% over a 30-year mortgage
costs the consumer over three times the mortgage value of his property. Finally, in 1977
consumers paid $10 billion in brokerage commissions and approximately $5 to $10 billion
in settlement costs. OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FED. TRADE COMM'N, HOUSING POL-
ICY REVIEW BRIEFING BOOK (1978) [hereinafter cited as FTC HOUSING POLICY REVIEW].
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3531-32, 3531 (1976) (establishing HUD "to encourage the maxi-
mum contributions that may be made by vigorous private home building and mortgage
lending industries to housing, urban development, and the national economy. ... ).38
id. §§ 1802-19 (extending mortgage credit to and providing housing for veterans); 42 id.
§ 1471 (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture, through FMHA, to grant financial assist-
ance to rural landowners in order to improve rural living conditions). See notes 66-84
infra and accompanying text.
6. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), states in
part:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful.
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person,
partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition
or unfair or deceptive act or practice in commerce, and if it shall appear to the
Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of
[Vol. 29:527
CONSUMER PROTECTION
housing consumer protection.
This article looks at consumer protection issues as they relate
to federal housing policy. Part I examines the need for specific
consumer protections in the new-housing market. Part II surveys
the activities of federal agencies as they relate to consumer protec-
tion. The article concludes with an overview of new-home defects
and a prognosis for governmental reform and free market reme-
dies through private warranty programs.
I. THE NEED FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE PURCHASE
OF NEWLY CONSTRUCTED HOMES
About sixty-four percent of the nation's households own rather
than rent their housing,7 and the home has become the primary
middle class investment. It provides not only shelter but also a
possible hedge against inflation and an opportunity to benefit
from income tax subsidies. Yet, despite the great expense of a
home, most buyers make the purchase without the ability to eval-
uate its structural soundness or the condition of the mechanical,
electrical, and plumbing systems.9 These buyers need protection
because the construction defects possible in a new home are con-
siderable. For example, the Federal Trade Commission in its re-
cent consent agreement with the nation's fifth largest home
builder 0 alleged that
in some houses, fire walls were improperly anchored, founda-
tion walls were not covered with membrane waterproofing to
prevent water seepage into habitable space,. . . siding was not
properly anchored, roof sheeting did not meet with edges, .
piping and bathroom fixtures were not properly installed, .
walls were not properly supported by foundations, floor girders
were not properly supported to prevent sagging floors, or foun-
the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a
complaint ....
Id. § 45(a) (I), (b).
7. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, 1977
at 365 (1978).
8. See text accompanying note 84 infra.
9. Although precise figures are not yet available, it appears that few people avail
themselves of professional inspection services before signing an agreement to purchase. A
survey commissioned by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment found that only about 5,000 professional inspections were performed for home buyers
in 1977, including purchasers of both new and previously occupied homes. See U.S. DEP'T
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., I A STUDY OF HOME INSPECTION AND WARRANTY PRO-
GRAMS 15-16 (1977).
10. Kaufman and Broad, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,436 (1978).
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dations contained cracks due to structural failures. . ....
Although no statistics are yet available, anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that perhaps ten percent of new homes may have serious
defects such as inadequate insulation or faulty plumbing. 12
A. State Remedies for Home Buyers
Because of the perceived need to protect consumers from la-
tent defects, most jurisdictions impose an implied warranty of
habitability upon builders of new homes.' 3 Unfortunately, this
implied warranty is difficult for many home buyers to assert. The
builder may claim that the defects were within normal tolerances
or caused by the owner's failure to properly maintain the prop-
erty. 4 The buyer has a heavy evidentiary burden since he must
document the extent of damage from the defect and establish that
the builder failed to construct a workmanlike product suitable for
human habitation. 5 The home buyer may have to hire a profes-
sional inspector as an expert witness, retain an attorney, and pur-
sue the remedy through a long court battle.6 Finally, the builder
may be judgment-proof by the time suit is brought.
The State of New Jersey has recently attempted to provide a
11. Id. In signing the consent agreement, Kaufman and Broad agreed to make resti-
tution to the purchasers of certain defective homes and to offer warranties to all future
purchasers of its homes, but it did not concede any violations of law. Id.
12. See, e.g., Homeowners Outraged by New-House Defects and Delays on Repairs,
Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 3. While estimates of the incidence of new-home defects
are still somewhat speculative, the HUD Office of Inspector General found that 24% of
newly constructed homes in the § 235 subsidized housing program were defective. Over
two-fifths of that number had "significant defects affecting safety, health, or liveability."
Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies, Hearings Be/ore the Subcomm. on Priorities and
Economy in Government ofthe Joint Economic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1972). The
FTC recently commissioned a survey of the incidence and severity of new-home defects.
13. The implied warranty of habitability imposes liability on the seller or lessor of real
property for loss, injury, or damage caused by defects in the property. Annot., 25 A.L.R.
3d 383, 413-24 (1969). Several states statutorily require the warranty. Eg., MD. REAL
PROP. CODE ANN. § 10-203 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 327 A.02 (1978 Supp.). For an
overview of the doctrine's development, see Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales ofRealty -
Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); McNamara, The Implied
Warranty in New-Home Construction: Has the Doctrine ofCaveat Emptor Been Abolished,
I REAL EST. L.J. 43 (1972); Note, Implied Warranty ofFitnessfor Habitation in Sale of
ResidentialDwellings, 43 DEN. L.J. 379 (1966); Comment, Extension ofImplied Warranties
to Developer- Vendors of Completed New Homes, 11 URB. L. ANN. 257 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
15. Id. at 555.
16. The expense of housing-defect litigation can also deter government agencies from
lawsuits against builders of defective homes. See note 104 infra and accompanying text.
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more effective remedy. It has enacted a statute 7 which establishes
a new-home warranty security fund "to provide moneys sufficient
to pay claims by owners against builders participating in the fund
for defects in new homes covered by the new home warranty."'"
The statute expressly states that if a builder is unable or willfully
refuses to correct construction defects, an amount sufficient to cure
the problem shall be paid from the fund to the owner. The Com-
missioner of the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs
may then proceed against the builder.' 9 The level of funds as-
sessed against builders registered in the state is set by the Commis-
sioner.20 The Commissioner is also required to promulgate
regulations providing for the processing of claims against build-
ers.2 ' It remains to be seen whether other states will follow New
Jersey in assuring the purchaser of a defective new home an effec-
tive remedy to implement the implied warranty of habitability.22
B. Private Remedies: Home Warranties
One result of the growth of state-implied warranties of habita-
bility and of increased congressional attention to the problem of
defective new homes was the development of the Home Owners
Warranty (HOW) Program by the National Association of Home
Builders (NAHB). 23  The program has three main features: a
17. New Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act, 46 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B-I
to 3B-12 (West 1977).
18. Id. § 3B-7(a).
19. Id. § 3B-7(c).
20. Id. § 3B-7(a).
21. Id. § 3B-3(a).
22. For a less effective model, see OR. REv. STAT. § 701 (1977), which provides that
each builder must post a total bond of $5,000 against which consumer claims may be as-
sessed. Id. § 701.065. In addition, the builder must carry specified amounts of insurance
against injury or damage. Id. § 701.105. See also S. 2919, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
REc. 5519 (1978), introduced by Senator William Proxmire at the request of the Carter
administration on April 13, 1978. The bill provided that condominium purchasers claim-
ing defects could also proceed against subcontractors of the developer. Id. at 5337. Of
course, this remedy assumed that the subcontractor would be solvent after the developer
had gone out of business.
23. HOW is a wholly owned subsidiary of the NAHB. HOW officials sell the program
as a means of forestalling otherwise probable government intervention in the national
housing industry: "If industry self-regulation does not work, we can expect to vastly in-
crease government regulation which wouldn't distinguish between good and bad builders."
HOME OWNERS WARRANTY CORP., HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET I1, Item 16 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET]. Specifically, the industry was con-
cerned with three pieces of proposed legislation: (1) an amendment proposed by Congress-
woman Leonore Sullivan to the 1972 Housing Bill that would have extended the one-year
FHA warranty to three years and required builders to post a $1,000 construction bond on
each house; (2) an April, 1973 bill introduced by Senator Charles Percy that called for a
1979]
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package of explicit warranties, a mechanism to resolve disputes
between the buyer and the builder, and backing by an independ-
ent insurance company. HOW provides for a one-year warranty
against faulty workmanship or materials, as defined by HOW; a
two-year warranty against defects in wiring, piping, and ductwork
in the home's electrical, plumbing, heating, and cooling systems;
and a ten-year warranty against major structural defects in the
load-bearing portion of the home.24 HOW markets these warran-
ties through the builder,25 and the overall sales price of the home
includes the costs paid by the builder.26 The warranty makes the
builder responsible for warranty defects in the first two years,
while the HOW program, underwritten by an independent insur-
ance company, insures the home buyer for the remaining eight
years.27 If the builder is insolvent or refuses to make good on
valid claims in the first two years, the insurance company will re-
imburse the consumer.28
HOW offers conciliation and arbitration procedures to resolve
claim disputes between the initial or subsequent buyer and the
three-year warranty on new homes; and (3) a Truth-in-Lending bill introduced by Senator
Philip Hart that would have required the seller of a new or previously occupied home to
disclose to the buyer all known material defects and provided for punitive damages for all
false statements or omissions of fact in that disclosure. Truth-in-Housing Act, Hearings
Before the Consumer Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 46
(1973) (statement of the National Association of Home Builders). In addition, the NAHB
expressed concern about state and local government's intensified interest in consumer pro-
tection legislation. Id. at 49.
24. HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET, supra note 23, at 5-6. HOW defines the warran-
ties' functional terms and standards.
25. Id. Local HOW councils set registration fees and propose local modifications to
the first-year defect standards for approval by the parent corporation. The local council
also determines whether to accept a builder on the basis of such predetermined criteria as
the builder's track record and creditworthiness. Although the HOW program accepts non-
NAHB builders, registration fees are significantly higher for them than for NAHB mem-
bers. Nelson, Why Builders ShouldKnow HOW, REAL EST. REV., Spring 1978, at 48 ("De-
pending upon the state, the non-NAHB-affiliated builder may have to pay up to four times
more to enroll in HOW than the NAHB-affiliated builder."). The builder pays an initial
registration fee ranging from $100 to $400 or more, as well as a one-time enrollment charge
for each home to be covered by a HOW warranty. Id. The fee is currently $2 per $1,000 of
the gross sales price of the warranted home with a minimum fee of $50. The builder reen-
rolls in HOW each year for a renewal fee of $25 to $100 or more. The registration and
renewal fee go primarily to the local HOW council for merchandising and other expenses,
while one-half of the enrollment fee goes to HOW's insurer and one-quarter each to the
national HOW corporation and the local HOW council. Id.
26. Id. A purchaser may refuse to accept HOW coverage. HOW APPLICATION
BOOKLET, supra note 23, at 11, Item 23. In that case the builder still must pay a $30 admin-
istrative fee, but not the entire $2-per-$1000 warranty amount.
27. HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET, supra note 23, at 5-6.
28. Id.
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builder or insurance company.19 A builder may be expelled from
the HOW program for failure to comply with an arbitrator's deci-
sion.3° The procedures are designed to conform to the fairness,
impartiality, and speed required by the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act of 1975. 3'
From a consumer point of view, HOW may resolve two of the
major remedial problems of implied warranties for new-home de-
fects by providing both a fast dispute resolution mechanism that
binds the builder,32 and a pool of money to pay off claims against
an insolvent or recalcitrant builder.33 The third major consumer
protection element - a fair set of standards for determining a de-
fect - has not yet been fully satisfied by HOW. HOW officials
concede that the standards were adopted from the builder's per-
spective and without input from consumer or other nonbuilder
groups.34 Thus, for example, HOW limits the ten-year warranty
by defining a major structural defect as occurring only in the load-
bearing portion of the house." In doing so, however, HOW has
traded higher standards for lower insurance premiums. This con-
servative approach can be expected until a longer actuarial record
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. Nelson, supra note 25, at 46, 49.
31. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1976). The Federal Trade Commission has published implementing
regulations. 16 C.F.R. §§ 700-03 (1978). Although the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by
its terms does not apply to real property, it does apply to consumer products intended to be
attached to or installed in real property. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976). For a discussion of the
application of the Act to residential property, see Peters, How the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act Affects the Builder/Seller of New Housing, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 338, 338-63 (1977).
32. HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET, supra note 23, at 6-7. However, a serious short-
coming may be that some HOW conciliators or arbitrators approve superficial repairs to
correct the symptoms rather than origins of cracks, gaps, and other expensive home defects.
33. Id.
34. Meeting with NAHB and HOW officials in Washington, D.C. (October 23, 1978).
35. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Elizabeth Hanford Dole, while she was
a Commissioner of the FTC, signalled her agency's concern over these standards:
There are some questions concerning whether the standards for HOW claims ade-
quately serve the homebuyer. For example, do the HOW approved standards for
the first year provide sufficient consumer protection? Should the two year cover-
age of heating, plumbing, and electrical systems be limited to ductwork, pipes,
and wiring or the ten year coverage of major construction defects be limited solely
to loadbearing portions of the home?. . . [Aidding consumer representatives and
other interested parties to the HOW Board of Directors and the local HOW coun-
cils would certainly help to assure that the program responsively serves as broad a
market as possible and responds to a concern that a cross-section of interested
parties is not involved in the policymaking process.
Address by Elizabeth Hanford Dole, then a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, before the National Association of Home Builders Annual Convention in Las Vegas,
Nev. (Jan. 21, 1979).
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has been established for claims.36 Moreover, the advent of serious
competition from comparable warranty programs could result in
higher quality standards as well as lower prices.
A major problem with HOW as a consumer protection remedy
is that the large majority of builders do not offer such a program.
While more than 14,000 builders now belong to HOW and almost
eleven percent of the 1.5 million homes begun in fiscal year 1978
are covered by HOW warranties, 37 market penetration remains
spotty. It depends largely upon the aggressiveness of the individ-
ual builder association in sponsoring HOW.38 Nevertheless,
HOW officials are optimistic that the program will continue to
grow.
The New Jersey New Home Warranty and Builders' Registra-
tion Act 39 provides one means of extending coverage to all build-
ers regardless of their consumer protection inclinations. Section 5
of that statute requires every builder engaged in the business of
new-home construction to participate in either the state warranty
security fund or an approved alternative home warranty pro-
gram.4" Ralph Nader's Housing Research Group has advocated
extending this concept to all of the states by requiring that all
builders of homes financed through federally related mortgages
offer a new-home warranty. 4' As is the case with HOW, the war-
36. The oldest HOW home is now only about five years old.
37. Lots of Warranties but Spotty Coverage, HOUSING, Sept. 1978, at 16.
38. The drawback is that under the HOW program subscribing to the warranty is the
prerogative of the builder rather than the home buyer. The imperfection of the process can
be seen in a recent survey showing that 79% of home buyers consider a warranty very
important but only 22% of builders do. PROFESSIONAL BUILDER, Dec. 1977, at 71. Some of
the largest builders choose not to participate either because they believe that the quality of
their product is such that they do not need a warranty, or because they want to avoid
increasing their product's cost or reducing their profit. Lots of Warranties but Spotty Cover-
age, HOUSING, Sept. 1978, at 16. The results may well be a reverse selection process, with
the most consumer-minded builders joining HOW while the others - who cause much of
the problem ofunrepaired defects - do not. HOW APPLICATION BOOKLET, supra note 23,
at II. Moreover, HOW cannot afford to enroll builders known to have poor construction
practices.
39. 46 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B-1 to 3B-12 (West 1977).
40. Id. § 3B-5.
41. Future of FHA: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 385 (1977) (statement of Thomas H. Stanton, Director,
Housing Research Group). The testimony pointed to the British method that requires that
virtually all builders offer warranties. The result appears to be enhanced construction
quality because builders excluded from the warranty program for excessive defects in their
work product simply could not find financing. See, e.g., Note, The Homeowner's Warranty,
An Initial Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 357, 376-77, nn.99-104 and accompanying text
(1976). The British program has been systematically upgrading its construction standards
[Vol. 29:527
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ranty would be offered at the consumer's option; unlike HOW, it
could not be withheld at the builder's option.42 A similar recom-
mendation was recently made by a leading industry publication.43
Such proposals deserve consideration, but only if they make
economic sense. The question is whether imposition of a warranty
requirement, as in the New Jersey statute, would save the home
buying public more money than it would cost.
C. The Utility of New-Home Warranties. Costs v. Benefts
We live in an age that requires cost-benefit analyses to justify
government intervention in the marketplace.' Optimal quality
control will occur when the marginal cost of increased quality
control equals the discounted value of future defect repairs. This
section discusses the relative advantages to the consumer of new-
home warranties and compares the market costs of builder and
third party warranties.45
New-home warranties have three potential major advantages:
(1) spreading the risk of repairs over the home buying public, (2)
enhancing initial construction quality, and (3) decreasing total
as it gains experience. See, e.g., National House-Building Council, 1977 Houses Compared
With Early 1960's Houses: 57 Improvements in Minimum Standards (1978).
42. Id.
43. Warranty Should Be Required of Builders, PROFESSIONAL BUILDER, July 1979, at
1. According to the editor of Professional Builder, David E. Link,
a shortcoming of the HOW program is that it is available only to builder mem-
bers of the NAHB. The Association's membership of some 46,000 represents be-
tween 30,000 and 45,000 building firms - less than a third of the 127,000 home
building operations in the country.
True, the NAHB builders probably put up two-thirds of the housing and are,
as a group the most professional and competent builders in the country. But even
that membership has hardly stampeded to utilize the HOW warranty plan. Only
one in three of the builder members offers the 10-year warranty. And in the five
years that HOW has existed, less than 15 percent of the new houses sold have
been covered by the warranty plan.
Clearly, it is time that NAHB insist that all of its builder members join the
HOW program. Also, the HOW plan - or a form of it - should be made avail-
able to the 80,000 or so builders who are not members of NAHB.
44. See, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. Occupational Safety and Health Adm'n,
581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Although the agency does not have to conduct an
elaborate cost-benefit analysis,. . . it does have to determine whether the benefits expected
from the standard bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard.");
Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 839 (5th Cir.
1978) (The Commission must look "not only at the nature and severity of the risk, but also
at the potential the standard has for reducing the severity or frequency of the injury, and
the effect the standard would have on the utility, cost, or availability of the product.").
45. Much of this discussion is based upon Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of
Liabilijy, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973). See generally FTC HOUSING POLICY REVIEW,
supra note 4, at A-1 app.
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housing costs. While many home buyers may not need a warranty
since the builder would make good on valid claims without a war-
ranty, some will need it badly because the builder is judgment-
proof or recalcitrant in paying valid claims. Thus, the warranty
serves a valuable function; it distributes the risk of defects among
all home buyers and minimizes the chance of catastrophe for any
single one.
Second, in the absence of any type of legal liability or war-
ranty against defects in the new home, the builder has little incen-
tive to prevent such defects. He will consider the cost of
nonmandated building precautions unnecessary since the cost of
any repairs will fall entirely on the consumer. The only market
constraint (as distinguished from ethical considerations) on the
builder's utter carelessness is the risk that the consumer will dis-
cover certain defects in the newly built home and purchase a bet-
ter quality home from a competitor. This risk is minimal,
however, if the consumer is unable to evaluate independently the
quality of a home and the competitor is equally unable to prove
the superior quality of his product.46 Ideally a warranty program
would give builders cost incentives to prevent defects.
But who should provide these warranties? Warranties pro-
vided by the builder impose the risk of paying for repairs on the
builder rather than on the consumer. This situation is ideal since
it forces the builder to weigh his costs of initial precautions against
the cost of subsequent repairs. The builder's responsibility and
the forces of competition will presumably effect an average quality
which is both fair to the consumer and economically feasible for
the builder.47
The concept of builder-provided warranties has two problems.
First, in this situation the consumer pays indirectly for all the
builder's costs, including the cost of potential repairs. Second, the
proposal is unrealistic since builders may lack the incentive and
often the available funds to personally indemnify owners of defec-
tive new homes.48
A more feasible alternative is third party warranties.49 The
46. FTC HOUSING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at A-3 app.
47. Id.
48. Id. See, e.g., Sichelman, Housing Complaints to FTC Describe Buyers' Frustra-
tions, Washington Star, June 15, 1979, at D-l, col. 4; Most Buyers Complain, Most Builders
Respond, BUILDER, Nov. 1, 1979, at 48 (24.6% of buyers surveyed said the builder "did not
respond to their complaints at all").
49. The HOW program is developing an actuarial record that should allow private
insurance companies to increase the availability of these warranties.
[Vol. 29:527
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use of such warranties, which place the costs of repairs directly on
the builder, will help to approach the ideal situation since the in-
terests of the insurance company are closer to those of the con-
sumer than to those of the builder. The insurance company, while
indifferent to the costs of quality control, seeks to minimize pay-
ments for repairs." The concept of third party warranties has one
major problem: the insurance company generally cannot monitor
quality in areas where the cost of such monitoring would be pro-
hibitive.5 1 Consequently, builders will cut their own costs by tak-
ing fewer initial precautions in these areas, forcing insurance
companies to set higher premiums based upon an expected lower
average quality.
Despite the limitations on an insurance company's monitoring
ability, there are several built-in monitoring devices which may
help to increase quality and thereby lower premiums. First, com-
mon law rules imposing a minimum standard of care on the
builder may spur him to ensure the habitability of the home that
he constructs. 2 Second, building codes may also help to produce
a higher standard of builder workmanship. 3 These incentives
will diminish, however, in proportion to the costs required of the
consumer who seeks to enforce the law through litigation. Third,
the builder risks damage to his reputation by constructing poorly
built homes, though the deterrent effect of this risk may depend
upon the size of the community.54 Fourth, builders face expulsion
from the warranty program if they do not maintain basic quality
control in construction.5 Where a warranty is mandatory, expul-
sion can mean a builder will have to cease building.:6 Lenders
may also shy away from homes likely to have significant defects in
There are no plausible monopoly problems, no apparent economies of scale or
indivisibilities, nor are there overwhelming barriers to entry. However, there are
significant startup costs. The design of a totally new insurance policy for which
there is no experience on which to base premiums is very risky business which,
not surprisingly, insurance companies tend to shy away from.
FTC HOUSING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at A-7 app.
50. Id. at A-4 app.
51. Id. at A-4 to A-6 app.
52. Id.
53. There are several problems associated with building codes: (1) they frequently do
not reflect technological change, (2) they are often erratically enforced, and (3) their estab-
lishment and enforcement are too often politically influenced. Id. at A-6 app.
54. The citizens of a large community are typically less aware of the quality of a
builder's work product than the citizens of a smaller community. Id. at A-5 app.
55. See Nelson, supra note 25, at 48.
56. See note 41 supra.
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order to maximize the value of their security.17 Finally, competi-
tion among builders may help to improve quality. This will occur,
however, only when the consumer himself can discern the quality
of his prospective purchase or can afford a professional evalua-
tion.:8
While these constraints raise construction standards, they af-
fect only the lowest quality builder. The most important factor in
inducing improvement by other kinds of builders is co-insurance.
For example, the HOW program requires the builder (if solvent)
to pay all valid claims for repair on a home for the first two years
after construction. An impartial arbitrator processes claims, and
the builder's contract with HOW makes these decisions binding.
The builder has the advantage of a fair, efficient process; the
homeowner has avoided litigation. The market benefits because
co-insurance provides direct cost incentives for the builder to up-
grade quality control during construction.
In general, serious competition in the new-home warranty in-
dustry promises to bring lower prices for a given level of warranty
coverage than does the nascent HOW program, although the mag-
nitude of the average savings to home buyers under any type of
warranty program has never been measured. 9 Recently, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, with support from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, has commissioned a national
survey of the incidence and severity of new-home defects, but the
results will not be available for some months. Even without the
availability of statistical evidence, there is good reason to believe
the net benefit of a new-home warranty program will be signifi-
cant.
Much of the present lack of quality control in residential con-
struction can be traced to fluctuations in the housing and money
markets. After a slump in construction, when mortgage money
suddenly becomes available, builders must rush to staff up to take
advantage of the temporary boom in the credit cycle. They are
forced to hire unskilled labor and rely on on-the-job training. In
the rush to benefit from the temporary flow of mortgage money,
57. Lenders will usually avoid only the lowest quality builder since only then is it
likely that a defect will cause "damages so great as to destroy the owners' equity in the
house." FTC HoUSING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at A-5 app.
58. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
59. "Now that work has been done by the HOW program of NAHB,. competition
[will likely] take the form that it does in most insurance lines - underwriting competition.
Competitors will look for the best risks and undercut the premium presently charged; so-
called 'cream-skimming."' FTC HOUSING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at A-7 app.
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many builders have little on their minds besides the need for a
high volume of production before the market turns.6" After a year
or two, just at the point when construction crews have become
seasoned and capable, the credit cycle approaches a downturn. A
decline in availability of mortgage money forces builders to dis-
charge workers.
These cyclical fluctuations foster inadequate quality control.6'
If the builder can externalize the cost of defects to consumers, he
has no market incentive to maintain an adequate quality control
program. To the extent that a mandatory new-home warranty
program, public or private, will internalize the cost of defects, the
program will be cost-effective.
II. CONSUMER PROTECTION AND NATIONAL
HOUSING POLICY: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
Despite a multibillion dollar housing program funded by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the federal gov-
ernment has been relatively inactive in the area of housing con-
sumer protection. This inertia ignores the importance of housing
as a consumer purchase,62 the prevalence of housing defects as a
60. A recent HUD report concluded:
[Tihe underlying instability in housing production has a pervasive effect on
the basic technology, structure, and organization of the industry. The extreme
cyclic instability that characterizes housing production raises the cost of all real
and financial factors - land, labor, building materials, financing, and profit. In
the short run, housing slumps lead to idle plant and construction equipment, to
underutilized material manufacturing capacity, to homebuilder bankruptcies, and
to unemployment of construction workers. But it is the long-run effects of the
housing cycle that create the inefficiencies in homebuilding which are so costly to
the American homebuyer. The constant need to adapt to wide fluctuations in
production levels leads homebuilders and building material producers to use less
efficient technology so that they can minimize their fixed costs in plant and equip-
ment over a wide range of output levels. . . . Lumber prices and other building
materials follow these cyclical ups and downs, and the industry invests less in job
training to cut down on the cost of uncertain demand and labor turnover.
TASK FORCE ON Hous. COSTS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., FINAL REPORT OF
THE HUD TASK FORCE ON HOUSING COSTS 55-56, 1978.
61. There is some evidence that fluctuations in the housing credit cycle also disrupt
the ability of local communities to police housing quality through building code enforce-
ment. A locality may have little need for a large inspection staff during periods of scarce
mortgage money. But money may become available with little warning, and a rush of new
development may swamp the community's ability to oversee construction. See, e.g., DEP'T
OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS AND DEP'T OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF
NEW HOME CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS IN FAIRFAX COUNTY (VIRGINIA) 4 (1979) (report-
ing a 59%i1 ncrease in the number of homes under construction in that area between 1977
and 1978 alone).
62. See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
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byproduct of cyclical fluctations in the housing market,63 and the
cost-effectiveness of new-home warranties.' It also ignores the
fact that a nationwide warranty program is now working in Brit-
ain.65
A. Historical Background
An understanding of this federal passivity requires an histori-
cal perspective. Today's federal housing policy, at least as it re-
lates to single family housing, grew out of the Great Depression.
The collapse of bank credit, including mortgage credit, caused a
virtual cessation of new construction. Production of homes in
1933 dropped to 93,000 units, less than one-tenth of those built in
1925.66 Congress reacted to this calamity by designing a national
housing policy that was intended to create a stable home mortgage
market.67 National housing policy was to be a federal mortgage
credit policy.
In 1934, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was cre-
ated 68 to appraise individual homes and to ensure that if a home-
owner defaulted on mortgage payments, his debt would be paid
by the federal government to the mortgage lender. 69 Through
FHA and the various secondary market institutions, such as the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)7 ° and the Fed-
eral Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC),7t the federal
government fostered a thriving national mortgage market. The
genius of the system was that it required no federal subsidy.
63. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 44-61 supra.
65. See note 41 supra. See generally OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
AND URBAN DEV., AN INSURED BUILDING WARRANTY PLAN FOR HOME BUYERS (1974) (a
proposal which describes and is patterned on the British warranty program). It was only
partly in jest that a consumer protection attorney in the Massachusetts Attorney General's
Office remarked: "Under the law in the United States you get more protection buying a
toaster than in buying a home." Raising the Roof. Buyers of New Homes Find Shoddiness,
Flaws are Growing Problems, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, WORKING
PAPERS 1, NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW 9 (1976).
67. This emphasis on housing as a credit problem explains why the congressional
housing subcommittees are installed as subsidiaries of the House and Senate Banking
Committees.
68. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1702
(1976)).
69. Exec. Order No. 7,280 (1934).
70. See National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1716(b) (1976)).
71. See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351,
84 Stat. 451 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1452 (1976)).
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Through a small surcharge on the mortgage rate, the FHA actu-
ally turned a profit for several decades.
Incidental to its primary mortgage credit functions, the FHA
also provided some consumer protection. The FHA appraisal of
the property, used to determine the size of the mortgage that the
federal government would insure, was also used to screen out
homes with especially serious defects that affected marketability
of the property. Eventually, the FHA promulgated a set of Mini-
mum Property Standards,7 2 which defined the minimum construc-
tion quality necessary for government mortgage insurance. Many
builders, even if they did not use FHA financing, adopted the
FHA standards for convenience. The term "FHA-approved," or,
later, "FHA-VA-approved," became a symbol of quality to home
buyers.
Impressed with the success of the FHA program, Congress au-
thorized the Veterans Administration to begin a similar housing
program after World War II to benefit returning soldiers.73 The
VA program provides a mortgage guaranty similar to the success-
ful FHA model, with such minor variations as a provision requir-
ing no down payment by the veteran home buyer.74 Together, the
FHA and the VA facilitated the dramatic burgeoning of the sub-
urbs in the postwar years.
Congress attempted, in 1954 and again in 1964, to augment the
consumer protection provided by these agencies. The Housing
Act of 195411 authorized the Secretary of HUD to require the
seller or builder of an FHA- or VA-approved home to warrant to
the purchaser that the dwelling was built in substantial conformity
with the plans and specifications approved by the FHA or VA.7 6
The Housing Act of 1964"7 authorized the FHA to pay the owner
of an FHA home any costs incurred in correcting "substantial de-
fects" in the home if such payment is requested within four years
of acquisition of the mortgage insurance.7" FHA action under the
72. Minimum Property Standards, 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.925-.93i (1979).
73. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, ch. 268, §§ 500(a), 501, 58 Stat. 291 (re-
pealed by Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 14(87), 72 Stat. 1273) (current version
at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04, 1810 (1976)).
74. 38 U.S.C. § 1805 (1976).
75. Ch. 649, 68 Stat. 590 (1954) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 20, 31 U.S.C.).
76. Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 801, 68 Stat. 642 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701j-1
(1976)) (in the case of V.A. housing, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1805 (1976)).
77. Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769 (1964) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20,
38, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
78. Housing Act of 1964, § 121, 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(a) (1976).
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1964 provision, known as section 518(a), has been reluctant at
best.7 9
As the veterans and increasingly affluent members of the mid-
dle class were successfully housed in the 1950's and 1960's, hous-
ing proponents - home builders, mortgage lenders, savings and
loan institutions, labor unions, and political liberals - sought to
expand homeownership to lower income groups through subsi-
dized programs. Unfortunately, the FHA was administratively
unprepared for the difficult tasks of appraising homes in lower
income neighborhoods and protecting the government against
fraud. When the dust finally settled in the FHA scandals, hun-
dreds of people had been indicted, including some in high levels
of the FHA bureaucracy. The majority of honest and competent
FHA officials found themselves discredited and demoralized. Cit-
ing the scandals, the Nixon administration in 1973 ordered termi-
nation of the range of federally subsidized housing programs,
primarily as a means of reducing federal expenditures.8 °
Meanwhile, the FHA's success with unsubsidized housing pro-
grams encouraged competition from a nascent private mortgage
insurance industry." The FHA experience over several decades
provided an actuarial record on which private mortgage insurers
could base their premium schedules. They skimmed, of course,
the most lucrative parts of the market. Today, the FHA insures
mortgages on only eight percent of single family homes bought
during the year; the VA guarantees mortgages on only another
eight percent. The remaining eighty-four percent of home mort-
gages insured in 1978 were privately insured or uninsured. 2
The swing from federal to private mortgage insurance has un-
dercut support for federal housing programs. Home builders,
lenders, and labor, the traditional and essential supporters of
strong federal housing programs, have displayed less interest in
these programs. While those groups have been losing interest in
79. See text accompanying notes 86-90 infra.
80. See, e.g., Statement of George Romney, former Secretary of HUD, reprinted in
U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., HUD NEws (Jan. 8, 1973); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW 83
(1974).
81. The Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation (MGIC) was formed in 1957 and
was quickly followed by over a dozen other firms.
82. The government had an even smaller share of the new-construction market: the
FHA insured 4.5% and the VA guaranteed 7% of the mortgages on new homes bought in
1978. The remaining 88.5% were privately insured or uninsured. Telephone Interview
with the Office of Policy Development and Research, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, in Washington, D.C. (April 6, 1979).
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HUD, local governments have successfully lobbied the depart-
ment for economic development subsidies. Less than half of the
eleven billion dollar budget of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development now goes to private housing; most of the re-
mainder is earmarked for community and urban development
grants.8 3 The HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing, who over-
sees the FHA and public housing programs, has already spoken of
the possibility of extending FHA jurisdiction to insure mortgages
on commercial and industrial properties. The constituency of the
nation's housing department is, in short, changing. As the housing
industry itself has turned to the private sector, HUD is becoming
more responsive to economic development objectives, particularly
those advanced by the nation's city and county governments.
The one federal housing program to survive this change is the
system of income tax subsidies for homeownership. The deduc-
tions for home mortgage interest and property tax payments
amount to a revenue loss of $14.6 billion, or more than the com-
bined funding of all HUD housing programs. Total homeowner-
ship tax subsidies amount to much more.84 These subsidies are
regressive: a deduction confers benefits directly proportional to
the size of the home (or homes) the taxpayer owns and the home-
owner's tax bracket. This distribution of benefit in favor of the
well-to-do appears to have been one reason for the preservation of
the tax subsidy from the fate of the declining direct housing subsi-
dies. Upper income taxpayers have been strong supporters of the
housing tax subsidy programs; by contrast, lower income housing
consumers and their industry and liberal allies have proven them-
selves unable to secure congressional support for broad-based
housing programs.
B. Federal Consumer Protection and Housing
It has been difficult to make consumer protection attractive to
constituencies that otherwise support federal housing programs.
Financial, labor, industry, and consumer interests have been able
to agree on federal subsidies for housing. But lenders, workers,
and the housing industry tend to lose interest once the housing is
83. SPECIAL ANALYSES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL
YEAR 1980 at 198 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL ANALYSES].
84. This figure does not include increases in homeowner tax benefits enacted by Con-
gress in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 404, 405, 92 Stat. 2763, or more
important, the tax exemption on imputed income from homeownership. SPECIAL ANALY-
SES, supra note 83, at 186, 198.
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funded and built. Then the only one interested in better protec-
tion is the consumer.
The problem is that the consumer's interest in protection is dif-
ficult to reconcile with those of HUD or the other constitutent
groups. A policy paper, prepared for then Housing Secretary
James T. Lynn, explains that:
Normally, consumer protections involve some additional bur-
dens on the lender, builder or the manager of the housing.
Thus, builders have objected as to the existing requirement that
they give the home purchaser a warranty against structural de-
fects. . . . These and many other mortgage insurance require-
ments bear on whether a sponsor decides to use [FHA]
mortgage insurance. That affects production. Therefore, any
proposed legislation for additional consumer protection or
other benefits [for FHA houses alone] must be weighed against
its possible curtailment of the use of the program."'
Thus, fearing that builders and lenders might desert the FHA pro-
gram, HUD has cautiously limited new consumer protections for
FHA home buyers. For example, in 1976, HUD created an Assis-
tant Secretary for Consumer Affairs and Regulatory Functions.
The office soon changed its name, however, to Neighborhoods,
Voluntary Associations, and Consumer Protection. The change
downgraded consumer issues in favor of neighborhood revitaliza-
tion - a popular theme that can be pursued without having to
confront the problems that increased consumer protection would
pose for some lenders and builders upon whom HUD programs
still depend.
HUD has not fully implemented the limited consumer protec-
tion provisions that are already law.16 The Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development is authorized, pursuant to section 518(a)
of the National Housing Act, to reimburse purchasers who repair
new FHA homes with structural defects.87 HUD administration of
that provision and the other builders' warranty provisions has
85. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, WORKING
PAPERS 1, NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW 77 (1976). See U.S. DEP'T OF HoUS. AND
URBAN DEV., HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES, NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY REVIEW 24
(1974).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(a)-(e)(1976). Indeed, it was FHA and VA reluctance to support
consumer defect claims that led to the 1954 changes in the law. The Subcommittee on
Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Finance "found that FHA and VA offi-
cials often provided little or no assistance in pressing claims against the builders, and that
even when such claims were pressed, FHA or VA accepted the builder's statements that
repairs had been made when as a matter of fact they had not." Bearman, supra note 13, at
551.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(a) (1976).
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been criticized by the General Accounting Office and by legal
services attorneys across the country.88 The same protection is
also available to lower income purchasers of used FHA homes
with structural or other major defects.8 9 HUD's administration of
that program has not been without criticism. 9°
In 1976 Congress instructed HUD to survey the incidence of
defects in newly purchased used homes and to evaluate the possi-
bility of establishing a federal inspection and warranty program to
protect home buyers against defects. 9 ' The study and report were
to be submitted to Congress by March 1, 1977.92 Although HUD
did complete the survey, the agency has not yet transmitted any
policy recommendations to Congress.
In spite of their administrative difficulties, HUD officials at all
levels have continued to express concern with consumer protec-
tion issues. Numerous HUD internal working papers, from the
Office of Housing as well as from the Office of Neighborhoods,
Voluntary Associations, and Consumer Protection. have deliber-
ated the wisdom and feasibility of various home warranty pro-
grams.93 Moreover, HUD has contributed half of the funding for
88. See, e.g., Letter from Henry Eschwege, Director of the Community and Economic
Development Division, General Accounting Office, to Carla Hills, former Secretary of
HUD, reprinted in FUTURE OF FHA: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SEN. COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 390 (1977); U.S. OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, REPORT OF THE U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CONSTRUCTION
PROBLEMS WITH COUNTRY CLUB ESTATES, MERRIMACK, N.H. (Oct., 1976); ADMINISTRA-
TION OF HUD's SECTION 518(b) PROGRAM: HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMM. OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1977) (testimony
on § 518(a) by Seymour J. Mansfield, Attorney for the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Chicago).
89. National Housing Act § 5 18(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1785b(b) (1976). Congress passed this
provision in response to consumer complaints about defects in the HUD lower income
homeownership program. The HUD Office of Inspector General had found that 24% of
newly constructed homes and 39% of the previously occupied newly purchased homes in
the low income program were defective. See Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Eco-
nomic Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1972).
90. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Harris, No. 73-C-34 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 1979) (HUD stipulation
to reprocess claims under § 518(b)); UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL, NEED FOR FAIRER
TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERS' CLAIMS FOR DEFECTS IN EXISTING INSURED HOMES (July
1977); Finding Faults: Homeowners Raise Roof Over HUD Rejection of Most Repairs
Claimed Under Federal Law, Wall St. J., July 2, 1976, at 28, col. 1.
91. Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 9, 90 Stat. 1072 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 1735b(e) (1976)).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Memorandum from George Brown, Associate Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Neighborhoods and Consumer Affairs, to Marilyn Melkonian, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Insured and Direct Loan Program (Feb. 1, 1978) (on file with the author);
1979]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the joint FTC-HUD survey of the incidence and severity of new-
home defects. This continuing, if constrained, involvement with
housing consumer protection issues may indicate a renewed HUD
interest in creating a consumer constituency to support its housing
and community development programs.
C. The FTC and Housing
The Federal Trade Commission has a mandate to protect con-
sumers from unfair and deceptive practices and to protect the
marketplace from unfair methods of competition.94 Through that
mandate the agency has been involved in many housing-related
matters, including both individual cases and rulemaking.95
The FTC became seriously involved in the new-housing prob-
lem only upon the passage in 1975 of the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act.9 6 That Act
extended the agency's jurisdiction to matters affecting, not merely
in, interstate commerce. 97 Housing-related issues have occupied
considerable resources within the Commission, between forty and
fifty attorney work years in 1978 alone, or six percent of total FTC
attorney staff time.98 On May 23, 1979, the Commission formally
announced its new-home construction defects enforcement pro-
gram within its Bureau of Consumer Protection.
Memorandum from George 0. Hipps, Jr., Office of Underwriting Standards, to Sanford
Witkowski, Acting Director, Office of Policy and Program Analysis and Development (Jan.
6, 1975) (on file with the author).
94. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See note 6 supra and
accompanying text.
95. Consumer protection cases include Insilco Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 21,389 (1978) (consent order requiring sellers of pre-cut home packages to notify pur-
chasers that assembly requires experienced construction help, and to process complaints
according to specified procedures); In re Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc., 84 F.T.C. 1253
(1974) (consent agreement requiring 25 manufacturers and trade associations to cease mar-
keting foamed plastic insulation as nonburning or self-extinguishing, to notify past pur-
chasers of fire hazards, and to spend $5 million on research to minimize fire dangers).
Among regulatory activities affecting housing are the proposed Standards and Certifi-
cation Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,269 (1978) (setting procedural requirements for private devel-
opers including model code organizations whose standards are later incorporated into local
building codes) and the proposed Mobile Home Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 23,334 (1978) (setting
performance standards for mobile home manufacturers and sellers offering written or im-
plied warranties). The commission recently accepted a consent agreement with Kaufman
and Broad, see notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text (alleging serious defects and
requiring the builder to offer a HOW-type warranty to all future home buyers and to make
restitution to some of the past purchasers of defective homes).
96. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
97. Id. § 201(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970)).
98. FTC HousING POLICY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 1.
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In part as a result of publicity given the Kaufman and Broad
matter, the FTC has received an increasing volume of consumer
complaints about new homes. As mentioned above, the agency
has responded (with support from HUD) by commissioning a sur-
vey of the incidence and severity of new-home defects. Initially,
the survey will help provide a statistical basis for the volume of
news stories, consumer complaints, and anecdotal evidence con-
cerning the seriousness of the new-home defect problem. The sur-
vey may also prove valuable in informing the FTC and other law
enforcement agencies about the most effective allocation of re-
sources: for example, whether enforcement efforts should focus
on larger or smaller builders or on selected demographic regions
of the country.
In a major policy address, delivered to the 1979 annual con-
vention of the National Association of Home Builders, Elizabeth
Hanford Dole, then a Commissioner of the FTC, signalled the
agency's increasing concern with the new-home defect problem:
You may think, as I do, that Americans are fed up with Big
Government and want it to keep its cotton-pickin' hands out of
private enterprise. That is true generally, but it is not true in
every instance. There are many cases-and homebuilding is
certainly one of them-where consumers are demanding more
protection from the government, not less .... And it will not
be denied over an issue so fundamental as decent housing. So I
say to you today that as homebuilders, you have a choice: ei-
ther you can each independently decide to make self-regulation
work or you can brace yourself for full-scale, hard-hitting regu-
lation from the government. It's that simple.
As homebuilders, you already have in your hands the in-
strument that you need. The HOW program, while imperfect,
offers an excellent opportunity for homebuilders to be respon-
sive to consumer concerns-and ultimately to bring great bene-
fit to builders themselves .... 99
Commissioner Dole indicated that, in addition to possible di-
rect action, the FTC might consider bolstering state enforcement
practices:
The Commission has authorized its staff to investigate the inci-
dence and severity of defects in new homes and the response of
homebuilders to these problems, and to propose options to us
in the near future. We may decide to bring increasing re-
sources to bear against individuals and companies engaging in
especially disreputable homebuilding practices, or these options
may include increased support of state attorneys general in
99. Address, supra note 35.
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prosecuting violators under the state "little FTC Acts.'' o°
This approach has some promise. The states have come far since
Bearman's seminal 1961 law journal article' 0 ' and the early cases
extending the warranty of fitness to real estate. The New Jersey
law, supported by builders as well as consumers, may well be a
model for legislation by other states that will extend warranty
benefits and include a fair means of resolving disputes and in-
dependent insurance protection.10 2
Another important step has been the law enforcement activity
of state attorneys general, sometimes under "little FTC acts," to
force builders of shoddy houses to offer warranty protection or
provide other relief.0 3 Federal support might help to encourage
state attorneys general to become involved and might supplement
the activities of those states that are concerned about policing
housing defects but lack enforcement resources.1' 4 It remains to
be seen whether the new interest by the federal government will
result in the needed protection of home buyers, and how this pro-
tection will compare to that offered in those states unwilling to
wait for potentially more comprehensive federal action.
100. Id.
101. See note 13 supra.
102. See text accompanying notes 17-22 supra. It will be up to the courts to assure that
the New Jersey law is interpreted as a step forward in consumer protection. As was previ-
ously noted, the HOW standards for payment of defect claims are significantly narrower
than might be obtained by an aggrieved home buyer suing in court under the relevant
implied warranty law. This shortcoming in HOW is tolerable only because the alternative
of suing for all damages exists even for consumers with HOW coverage. New Jersey build-
ers will undoubtedly urge that that state's warranty law offers limited defect coverage. The
state's courts should interpret the express warranty as a supplement to, rather than a substi-
tute for, the state's judicially construed implied warranty. If builders can limit legal liabil-
ity to a very narrow set of defect claims, the warranty statute would have the effect of
reducing rather than increasing vigilance in construction quality. The overall cost of hous-
ing in New Jersey would increase correspondingly because builders would lose the incen-
tive to take the small steps during construction that can save many more repair dollars
later. See text accompanying notes 44-61 supra.
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., No. 78-034 (Cir. Ct. Ky.
April 11, 1978) (consent agreement requiring builder to provide restitution to past purchas-
ers of defective homes, to institute improved quality control, and to provide warranty pro-
tection for future home buyers).
104. For example, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office negotiated a consent
agreement, which was unpopular with some purchasers of defective Kaufman and Broad
homes, since it would have taken literally years to litigate a case. One can imagine that the
Office would be especially concerned about the state's legal resources being tied up in such
litigation. For coverage of the incident, see Attorney Presents "Buy Back" Proposal, The
Daily News, Newburyport, Massachusetts, July 27, 1978, at I; Raising the Roof" Buyers of
New Homes Find Shoddiness, Flaws Are Growing Problems, supra note 65, at 1, col. 6.
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III. CONCLUSION
The problem of new-home defects draws sporadic government
attention, corresponding roughly to consumer complaints follow-
ing the housing construction cycle."°5 The proposed federal home
warranty legislation and hearings of the early 1970's followed the
building boom that began in the late 1960's. The increased fed-
eral concern of the late 1970's followed the boom beginning in
1976. The earlier period of federal attention brought consumers
the HOW program-the nation's first large scale new-home war-
ranty effort. The more recent federal concern promises to extend
such warranty coverage to more than a fortunate minority of
home buyers and possibly to improve the quality of coverage as
well.
The housing cycle has also had its impact on the state and lo-
cal level. City and county building departments are staffed down
after a few years of slow building. Suddenly the boom comes, and
a locality is swamped with requests for building permits and in-
spections. Local governments face a dilemma: they don't want to
turn away business that means local prosperity; yet, by the time
they staff adequately to meet the sudden demand for building in-
spectors, the housing market will turn again, and they will not
need the new staff.
The present consumer outcry has been loud enough to per-
suade the FTC to allocate resources for a formal enforcement pro-
gram directed against especially bad actors in the residential
construction industry. The paradox of national housing policy is
that these developments are taking place outside traditional fed-
eral programs. The fear of private and public lawsuits, as well as
the possibility of governmental regulation and the inevitable dis-
covery that warranties can mean increased builder profits,'0 6 may
trigger free market responses bringing warranty protection to the
large majority of home buyers who want it.
105. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
106. A consumer survey indicated that 79% of the buyers of new homes rate a warranty
as "very important" in the decision to buy, while only 22% of the builders surveyed thought
that buyers considered warranties important. The magazine reporting the survey com-
mented that, "Builders rate warranties much lower and may be missing a sales bet." PRO-
FESSIONAL BUILDER, Dec. 1977, at 71. Another survey showed that 70% of the consumers
would be willing to pay at least $1,000 at the time of the purchase of a new home to reduce
maintenance costs later. PROFESSIONAL BUILDER, Dec. 1978, at 85.
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